Mali Sees Renewed Violence as Terrorist Groups Continue to Pose Threat
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
The Sahel region has long been plagued by terrorist activity, with groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State maintaining a presence in the area. Mali, in particular, has faced significant challenges in recent years, including a military coup in 2020 and ongoing attacks by terrorist organizations. According to Telegram intercepts, the Malian government has stated that it will not engage in dialogue with terrorist groups, instead opting for a military approach to combat the threat.
Mali’s Security Crisis Deepens as JNIM Intensifies Pressure on the Army
A series of major attacks in central and northern Mali is testing Bamako’s military-first counter-terrorism strategy, even as the government deepens security cooperation with Russia and its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States.
Mali is facing renewed pressure from jihadist insurgents as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, expands attacks against military positions, infrastructure and strategic locations across the country.
The latest violence has exposed the gap between Bamako’s stated determination to eradicate armed groups and the persistent ability of those groups to mount large-scale and coordinated operations.
On 10 September, JNIM fighters attacked a Malian military camp in Dioura in central Mali. Sources cited by Reuters said more than 100 Malian soldiers were killed, with estimates ranging from approximately 120 to 130 fatalities. More than 100 personnel were also reportedly taken hostage. The Malian military subsequently launched a large air-and-ground operation against the attackers.
The scale of the attack makes it one of the most serious recent battlefield setbacks for Mali’s armed forces.
It also raises a larger strategic question: whether the government’s increasingly militarized counter-terrorism model is reducing the insurgency’s capacity — or merely forcing militant networks to adapt.
JNIM Is Expanding the Battlefield
The September attacks are part of a broader deterioration rather than an isolated resurgence.
JNIM has expanded its operational reach from its traditional areas in northern and central Mali into western and southern parts of the country. The group has increasingly targeted army bases, transportation routes, economic infrastructure and locations closer to Bamako.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has described this trend as a long-term deterioration in Mali’s security environment, noting that JNIM has increased both the geographic reach and coordination of its operations.
In September, militants also targeted the strategically important Sévaré area.
JNIM claimed attacks against air-defence systems at Sévaré airport, where Malian military aircraft and drones are based. The airport reportedly came under shelling for six consecutive nights, while fighting also intensified around Konna. Russian personnel supporting Malian forces were reportedly among those treated for injuries following the attacks.
The operational significance is important.
JNIM is no longer relying solely on ambushes against isolated patrols or attacks on remote villages. Increasingly, it is demonstrating the ability to pressure military installations, threaten aviation infrastructure and sustain operations against positions that are central to Mali’s counter-insurgency campaign.
Bamako Maintains a Hard Line Against Negotiations
Mali’s government has publicly rejected negotiations with organizations it classifies as terrorist groups.
Following coordinated attacks in April 2026, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop told diplomats in Bamako that the government did not envisage dialogue with armed terrorist organizations. He said authorities remained committed to defeating them while continuing to accept individuals who renounced armed activity and returned to what the government describes as the republican framework.
Diop also praised military and political support from Burkina Faso, Niger and Russia.
The position reflects a broader shift in Mali’s security doctrine.
Rather than negotiating with JNIM or relying on Western-led counter-terrorism partnerships, Bamako has placed greater emphasis on military operations, cooperation with its neighbours in the Alliance of Sahel States and an increasingly close relationship with Moscow.
The September attacks are therefore not only a battlefield test.
They are a test of the security model that Mali’s military-led government has spent several years constructing.
Russia Has Become Central to Mali’s Security Strategy
Russia is now one of the most important external actors in Mali’s security architecture.
The Wagner Group formally ended its deployment in Mali in 2025, but Russia maintained its presence through Africa Corps, a formation operating under much closer control of the Russian Defence Ministry.
Africa Corps personnel have continued operating alongside Malian forces against JNIM and other armed groups.
In July 2026, Russia, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger agreed to deepen military and military-technical cooperation, including Russian support for the armed forces and the emerging unified force of the Alliance of Sahel States.
The relationship gives Mali access to training, military personnel, equipment and operational support.
But Russian involvement has not yet produced a decisive reversal of the insurgency.
Africa Corps itself has suffered casualties in fighting, while convoys carrying Russian personnel and Malian troops have been attacked in northern Mali. In July, a convoy reportedly carrying more than 200 Russian fighters and over 100 Malian soldiers came under attack while moving toward Anefis.
This suggests that Russian support has increased the government's military capacity without eliminating the insurgents’ ability to contest territory or strike government forces.
Civilian Protection Is Becoming Part of the Strategic Problem
Military effectiveness is not the only measure of Mali’s counter-terrorism campaign.
Civilian casualties and alleged abuses by security forces have increasingly become part of the security equation.
In July, Human Rights Watch accused Russia’s Africa Corps of carrying out an indiscriminate airstrike in the Mopti region that killed eight civilians, including three children. Africa Corps said the operation targeted militants. Reuters reported that rights organizations have raised wider concerns about civilian harm involving both Malian and Russian forces.
The allegations matter strategically because insurgencies are shaped not only by battlefield losses but also by recruitment, local legitimacy and access to communities.
The Africa Center has argued that civilian deaths attributed to Sahel militaries and their Russian partners can contribute to grievances that militant organizations exploit for recruitment.
For Bamako, the challenge is therefore larger than killing militant commanders.
A durable counter-insurgency strategy requires intelligence from local communities, protection of civilians, control of transportation corridors and a credible state presence after military operations end.
Mali’s Conflict Is Increasingly Regional
The security crisis cannot be understood within Mali’s borders alone.
JNIM operates across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while Islamic State in the Sahel Province remains another significant armed actor, particularly in border regions.
The three military-led governments have responded by strengthening cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES.
Russia has also expanded its relationship with the bloc as a whole rather than treating Mali as an isolated security partnership.
For related coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Burkina Faso’s Military Re-orientation Amid Ongoing Coup Dynamics.
The regional logic is clear.
Militant organizations move across borders, exploit differences in state capacity and use remote frontier regions as logistical and operational spaces. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore have strong incentives to coordinate intelligence, aviation, border control and ground operations.
The question is whether the emerging AES security architecture can translate political cooperation into sustained operational effectiveness.
The Geography of the Insurgency Is Changing
One of the most important indicators is where JNIM is choosing to operate.
Historically, Mali’s insurgency was concentrated primarily in northern and central regions.
That pattern has changed.
JNIM has increasingly operated in western Mali, including areas close to Senegal and Mauritania, while simultaneously maintaining pressure in central and northern regions.
The Africa Center has documented attacks against transportation corridors, fuel movements and population centres in western Mali, describing them as part of an effort to exploit economic and political vulnerabilities rather than simply seize territory.
That approach can impose significant costs on the government.
An insurgent movement does not necessarily need to capture Bamako to weaken the state. Disrupting highways, attacking military bases, restricting fuel movements and forcing security forces to defend multiple regions simultaneously can gradually erode state authority.
The threat is therefore increasingly measured by access and disruption, not only by territorial control.
Mali’s Political Context Remains Part of the Security Equation
Mali has been governed by military authorities since the coups of 2020 and 2021.
The leadership justified its takeover in significant part by arguing that the existing political system had failed to restore security.
That makes continuing deterioration particularly consequential for the government.
The legitimacy of Mali’s current security model is closely tied to its ability to demonstrate that military rule, regional cooperation through the AES and the partnership with Russia can produce better security outcomes than the previous Western-backed approach.
JNIM’s ability to conduct major operations therefore creates pressure not only on the armed forces but also on the political narrative underpinning the current government.
Strategic Assessment: The Test Is Territorial Control, Not Operational Tempo
Mali’s counter-terrorism campaign is clearly active.
That does not necessarily mean it is succeeding.
The critical measurement is not how many military operations are conducted or how many militants authorities say have been killed. The more important question is whether the government can prevent JNIM from regenerating forces, attacking military infrastructure and expanding into new geographic areas.
Several indicators deserve close monitoring.
First, central Mali. The aftermath of the Dioura attack will show whether Malian forces can restore security around major military positions and prevent repeated attacks.
Second, Sévaré and Konna. Continued pressure on aviation and military infrastructure would indicate that JNIM retains the ability to challenge strategically important government assets.
Third, Russian involvement. The performance and deployment pattern of Africa Corps will help determine whether Moscow increases its operational commitment following recent setbacks.
Fourth, western Mali. Further expansion toward Senegal and Mauritania would reinforce evidence that the conflict is moving beyond its traditional northern and central theatres.
Fifth, the AES joint force. Its ability to conduct sustained cross-border operations will be a key test of whether the new regional security architecture offers capabilities that individual national armies have lacked.
Mali government has made clear that it intends to pursue a hard-line military strategy against jihadist organizations.
The events of 2026 demonstrate that JNIM is adapting to that strategy rather than disappearing under its pressure.
The central question for Bamako is therefore no longer whether it can launch counter-terrorism operations. It is whether those operations can produce lasting control in areas where armed groups continue to regenerate, move and strike.
For continuing coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Counter-Terror, Military and Geopolitics sections.