Terrorism Expands Across Sahel as Sudan War Fuels Arms Flows
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
From Sudan and Chad to Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, expanding arms networks, weak borders and jihadist groups are creating a widening belt of insecurity across Africa.
Terrorism Expands Across the Sahel as Sudan War Fuels Regional Arms Flows
From Sudan’s war economy in the east to the expanding jihadist insurgencies of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Africa is confronting a widening belt of insecurity in which weapons trafficking, weak border control, organized crime and armed groups increasingly reinforce one another.
Africa’s security crises are becoming more interconnected.
In Sudan, a war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has created a sprawling regional economy involving weapons, foreign fighters, smuggling routes and illicit finance.
Farther west, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are confronting an entrenched jihadist insurgency led primarily by al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, and Islamic State-linked forces.
These are not the same conflict.
There is currently no reliable evidence that JNIM operates a single organized supply corridor stretching directly from Sudan to Burkina Faso.
But the distinction should not obscure the broader strategic trend.
Across the belt running from Sudan and Chad toward the central Sahel, armed actors increasingly operate in environments defined by porous borders, illicit weapons markets, limited state presence and transnational trafficking.
The result is a security problem that is becoming progressively harder to contain within national borders.
The Sahel Is Now Africa’s Deadliest Jihadist Theatre
The scale of militant Islamist violence across the central Sahel has increased dramatically.
According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9,928 fatalities linked to militant Islamist organizations were recorded in the Sahel during the 12 months ending in mid-2026.
That represents approximately 42% of all fatalities linked to militant Islamist organizations across Africa — more than in any other region.
The majority of the violence is concentrated in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
JNIM has become the dominant organization, accounting for approximately 76% of militant Islamist-linked fatalities in the Sahel during the latest reporting period.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, increasingly referred to as Islamic State Sahel Province, accounted for another 19%.
Read the Africa Center assessment
The scale of the deterioration is striking.
Since 2022, nearly 49,000 deaths linked to violent extremism have been recorded across the Sahel.
JNIM has also evolved from a largely rural insurgency into a network capable of coordinated attacks against military bases, transportation corridors, airports and economic infrastructure.
This represents a fundamental change in the threat.
The challenge is no longer simply preventing isolated terrorist attacks.
It is preventing armed organizations from gradually eroding state access to entire regions.
Burkina Faso Has Become One of the Main Centres of the Crisis
Burkina Faso remains one of the countries most exposed to jihadist violence.
Militant networks have established significant freedom of movement across parts of the country while repeatedly targeting soldiers, civilian communities and transportation routes.
Burkina Faso accounted for approximately half of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities in the Sahel during the most recent Africa Center reporting period.
The conflict has also transformed the country’s security structure.
Ouagadougou is expanding the regular armed forces, recruiting tens of thousands of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland and developing a large reserve force.
The objective is straightforward: create enough manpower to hold territory that jihadist organizations have been able to penetrate or isolate.
But manpower alone does not solve the problem.
The state must also secure roads, maintain logistics, collect intelligence and provide governance after military operations.
Without that permanent presence, militants can withdraw temporarily and return once government forces move elsewhere.
Mali Shows How the Insurgency Is Adapting
Mali remains another central battlefield.
JNIM has expanded far beyond the northern areas traditionally associated with Mali’s jihadist insurgency.
The organization now conducts operations across central, western and southern regions while targeting military infrastructure and economically important transport corridors.
In September 2026, JNIM fighters attacked a military position at Dioura in central Mali.
Sources cited by Reuters said more than 100 Malian soldiers were killed and more than 100 personnel were reportedly captured.
The attack was followed by a major government counter-operation.
JNIM has also placed pressure on military infrastructure around Sévaré and other strategic areas.
The operational lesson is important.
The group is increasingly capable of forcing national armies to defend multiple areas simultaneously.
This disperses troops, increases logistical costs and creates new opportunities for insurgents elsewhere.
For related reporting, see Jerusalem Africa’s Counter-Terror coverage.
Niger Is Becoming Another Critical Front
Niger has experienced a similarly serious deterioration.
JNIM and Islamic State-linked organizations are both operating within or near Nigerien territory.
The threat has moved beyond remote border regions.
In 2026, militants targeted Diori Hamani International Airport and the adjoining military airbase in Niamey.
The ability of armed groups to attack strategic infrastructure near the national capital demonstrates the growing operational reach of Sahelian jihadist networks.
Islamic State-linked forces have also maintained pressure in western Niger, while violence has increasingly intersected with criminal and smuggling networks.
That combination makes the threat harder to dismantle.
Counter-terrorism forces may target identifiable jihadist units.
Smuggling systems, however, can survive by shifting between criminal, commercial and insurgent actors.
Sudan Is Adding Weapons and Fighters to an Already Unstable Region
The conflict in Sudan introduces a different but potentially important source of regional instability.
Sudan’s war began in April 2023 between the national army and the RSF.
Since then, the conflict has developed a large transnational logistical network.
United Nations investigators have documented weapons, drones, foreign fighters and military supplies moving through areas including Libya and Chad in support of Sudanese armed factions.
In July 2026, U.N. experts confirmed findings that aircraft had been used to move weapons, drones and mercenaries connected to RSF operations.
Reuters reporting on the U.N. findings
The Institute for Security Studies has also documented a growing arms economy around the Sudan-Chad border.
Weapons stolen, captured or abandoned during fighting in Darfur have reportedly entered markets in eastern Chad, where they can be resold into wider regional trafficking systems.
Read the ISS analysis
This does not demonstrate that Sudanese weapons are systematically reaching JNIM in Burkina Faso.
It demonstrates something broader.
Sudan has become another major source of weapons circulation within an African security environment where borders are already difficult to control.
Chad Is a Strategic Bridge
Geography makes Chad increasingly important.
The country sits between Sudan’s conflict zone, Libya, the Lake Chad Basin and the wider Sahel.
That position places it at the intersection of several different security systems.
To the east lies Sudan and Darfur.
To the north lies Libya and its long-established arms-trafficking networks.
To the southwest lies the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province remain active.
To the west lie Niger and the central Sahel.
Chad therefore does not need to become a jihadist stronghold itself to become strategically important.
Weapons, vehicles, smugglers and armed personnel moving through Chadian territory can potentially connect otherwise separate conflict economies.
This is one reason why deterioration in Sudan cannot be viewed solely as a Sudanese domestic problem.
The Bigger Threat Is the Convergence of Terrorism and Organized Crime
The African Union increasingly describes the threat in similar terms.
In July 2026, the AU Peace and Security Council warned of growing convergence between terrorism and transnational organized crime.
It specifically highlighted trafficking in:
weapons;
drugs;
people;
natural resources; and
illicit financial flows.
According to the AU, these networks provide terrorist organizations with sustainable financing and logistical support.
Read the African Union communiqué
This convergence changes the nature of counter-terrorism.
A militant organization no longer needs to control the entire supply chain supporting its operations.
It can purchase weapons from smugglers.
It can tax trafficking routes.
It can cooperate temporarily with criminal organizations.
It can capture weapons from national militaries.
And it can exploit poorly governed border regions for transport and recruitment.
The distinction between terrorism and organized crime therefore remains legally important, but operationally the two ecosystems can increasingly overlap.
Libya Remains a Major Arms Hub
The Sudan conflict is not the first African war to produce regional weapons proliferation.
Libya demonstrated the same dynamic after the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in 2011.
Large quantities of weapons left Libyan stockpiles and moved south toward Mali and other Sahelian states.
Those flows contributed to the transformation of security conditions in northern Mali and helped arm a variety of state and non-state actors.
Libya remains relevant today.
United Nations experts examining Sudan have identified southern Libya as part of supply routes supporting RSF-linked forces.
This creates another potential connection between eastern African conflict economies and the central Sahel.
Again, this should not be confused with proof of a single terrorist corridor.
The danger is the creation of interconnected markets where weapons can change hands multiple times before eventually reaching their final users.
JNIM Is Expanding Beyond the Traditional Sahel
The jihadist threat is simultaneously moving in the opposite direction — south and west.
JNIM has increased its activity toward coastal West Africa.
Militant organizations have attempted to establish or strengthen networks in Benin, Togo and parts of northwestern Nigeria.
The Africa Center estimates that Sahelian militant Islamist groups now operate across a geographic theatre stretching more than 1,200 kilometres.
Read the Africa Center assessment
This expansion is strategically important.
Coastal countries provide access to ports, major commercial routes and more densely populated economic centres.
JNIM does not necessarily need to capture these areas.
Even limited penetration can create smuggling opportunities, generate revenue and force governments to divert substantial resources toward northern border security.
A Wider African Security Belt Is Emerging
Taken together, these developments reveal a wider geographical pattern.
In the east, Sudan’s war is generating weapons, mercenaries and illicit financial networks.
Across Chad and Libya, long-distance trafficking routes connect multiple conflict economies.
In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram and Islamic State-linked organizations remain active.
Further west, JNIM and Islamic State-linked groups are challenging Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
And along the southern edge of the Sahel, jihadist organizations are probing coastal West African states.
These conflicts are not controlled by a single organization.
Nor are they one unified war.
But increasingly they share the same enabling conditions:
weak border enforcement;
large ungoverned or poorly governed spaces;
illicit weapons markets;
youth unemployment and local grievances;
competition over natural resources;
organized criminal networks;
and governments that struggle to maintain a permanent presence outside major cities.
That is what makes the continental trend strategically significant.
Military Responses Are Expanding Faster Than Regional Coordination
Governments are responding aggressively.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have created the Alliance of Sahel States and are attempting to develop integrated military capabilities.
Burkina Faso is expanding its armed forces and auxiliary formations.
Mali has deepened its partnership with Russia and Africa Corps.
Niger is reinforcing strategic infrastructure and border areas.
The African Union is calling for stronger intelligence-sharing and coordinated border management.
But armed organizations benefit from a structural advantage.
Borders divide governments.
They do not necessarily divide insurgents and traffickers.
A smuggling network can move from one jurisdiction into another faster than governments can exchange intelligence or authorize cross-border operations.
The challenge is therefore not only building larger armies.
It is developing security institutions capable of operating across borders with shared intelligence, coordinated surveillance and common threat assessments.
Civilian Harm Can Strengthen the Insurgency
There is another serious vulnerability.
Military campaigns that produce large-scale civilian casualties can strengthen militant recruitment.
The Africa Center reports that military and allied forces in Mali and Burkina Faso have been associated with substantial numbers of civilian deaths.
JNIM has attempted to exploit those incidents by portraying itself as a defender of communities targeted or marginalized by state forces.
That creates a strategic trap.
States need stronger military capabilities to confront armed organizations.
But indiscriminate or poorly controlled military operations can create the grievances that those same organizations use to recruit.
Successful counter-terrorism therefore requires more than battlefield superiority.
It requires civilian protection, governance, intelligence relationships with local communities and the ability to restore services after territory is secured.
Strategic Assessment: Africa’s Security Crises Are Becoming More Connected
The most important development is not the existence of a proven terrorist highway running directly from Sudan to Burkina Faso.
No reliable evidence currently demonstrates such a single corridor.
The larger threat is more serious precisely because it is less centralized.
Africa is seeing the emergence of an interconnected ecosystem of conflict.
Sudan contributes weapons, mercenary networks and a growing war economy.
Libya and Chad provide strategic transit zones.
The Lake Chad Basin contains established jihadist organizations.
Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso form the centre of Africa’s deadliest militant Islamist theatre.
And JNIM is attempting to expand toward coastal West Africa.
For Jerusalem Africa, six indicators should now be monitored closely:
Weapons flows from Sudan. Evidence that Sudanese-origin arms are appearing in Chad, Niger, Mali or Burkina Faso would indicate deeper convergence between the conflict economies.
JNIM expansion. Further movement toward coastal West Africa or northwestern Nigeria would demonstrate that the organization continues to widen its operational geography.
Chad’s stability. Deteriorating security there could weaken one of the most important geographical barriers between Sudan, Libya, the Lake Chad Basin and the central Sahel.
Trafficking routes. Changes in the movement of weapons, vehicles, gold, fuel and fighters can reveal emerging relationships before formal militant alliances become visible.
Cross-border intelligence cooperation. The ability of African governments to exchange information quickly will determine whether national security systems can keep pace with transnational networks.
Civilian security. Military gains will remain fragile if abuses, displacement and weak governance continue to create recruitment opportunities for extremist organizations.
The security map of Africa is becoming increasingly difficult to divide into separate national crises.
From Sudan’s expanding war economy to the jihadist insurgencies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the emerging challenge is a belt of instability in which conflict, trafficking and terrorism increasingly feed the same regional ecosystem.
For continuing coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Counter-Terror, Military and Geopolitics sections.