Iran's Nuclear Program Set Back Years, Former Israeli Minister Claims
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
A recent diplomatic briefing by the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs (JCFA) has shed light on the current state of Iran's nuclear program, with former Israeli Minister Yoval Steinitz asserting that the country's nuclear ambitions have been significantly hindered. According to Steinitz, Iran was mere months away from achieving a nuclear breakthrough before recent military strikes by Israel and the US set back their progress.
Iran Nuclear Program Damaged, but Scale of Setback Remains Unclear
Former Israeli minister Yuval Steinitz says Israeli and U.S. strikes pushed Iran several years away from producing a nuclear weapon. The available evidence confirms major damage to nuclear infrastructure, but U.S. intelligence assessments and the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate that significant uncertainty remains over Iran’s surviving enriched uranium and its ability to rebuild.
Iran’s nuclear program has suffered substantial physical damage, but determining how far Tehran has actually been pushed from a potential nuclear weapons capability remains considerably more difficult.
At a May 11 strategic briefing hosted by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, former Israeli minister and current Rafael Advanced Defense Systems chairman Yuval Steinitz argued that the military campaign against Iran had fundamentally changed Tehran’s nuclear trajectory.
Steinitz said that “most of the enrichment sites and almost all of the weaponization infrastructure” had been destroyed. He estimated that Iran had been only months away from potentially producing a nuclear weapon before the conflict and would now require between two and four years to rebuild its capabilities.
That is a significant assessment.
It is not, however, the only one.
U.S. intelligence assessments reported separately in May suggested a shorter setback, while the IAEA says it still cannot verify the location and condition of significant quantities of highly enriched uranium that existed before the attacks.
The central question is therefore no longer whether Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was damaged.
It clearly was.
The more difficult question is what survived — and how quickly Iran could reconstruct the capabilities that were lost.
What Steinitz Actually Said
Steinitz delivered his assessment during a strategic briefing in Jerusalem on May 11.
The former intelligence, finance and energy minister argued that Iran’s nuclear program had been one of the primary drivers of the Israeli decision to confront Tehran militarily.
According to his assessment, Iran had been approaching a point at which it could move toward a nuclear weapon within months before the strikes.
After the campaign, Steinitz estimated that rebuilding sufficient enrichment and weaponization infrastructure could require two to four years.
His remarks provide insight into the Israeli assessment of the campaign’s achievements.
But they should be identified as precisely that: an assessment from a former senior Israeli official who now chairs one of Israel’s largest defence companies, rather than an independently established measurement of Iran’s remaining nuclear capability.
That distinction is particularly important because nuclear timelines depend on several different capabilities.
Enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels is one component.
Turning sufficient fissile material into a deliverable nuclear weapon involves additional engineering, testing and weaponization requirements.
Statements that a country is “months from a bomb” can therefore describe different technical milestones depending on the assessment being used.
Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure Has Suffered Major Damage
There is little dispute that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted.
The Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan nuclear complexes were hit during U.S. and Israeli military operations, with additional attacks occurring during the renewed conflict in 2026.
IAEA reporting confirms that several facilities containing nuclear material were affected during the earlier strikes, including enrichment, conversion and fuel-related infrastructure.
Natanz was subjected to further aerial and missile attacks in March 2026.
The Iranian nuclear regulator reported no increase in off-site radiation following those attacks, according to information transmitted through the IAEA.
Physical destruction matters because uranium enrichment depends on large and technically demanding industrial systems.
Centrifuge halls, power systems, conversion infrastructure, research facilities and specialized equipment cannot necessarily be replaced immediately after destruction.
The loss of experienced scientists and engineers can impose additional delays that are harder to quantify from satellite imagery alone.
But damage to buildings and centrifuges does not answer the most important unresolved question.
The Enriched Uranium Stockpile Remains the Central Unknown
Before the major attacks, Iran possessed a large quantity of uranium enriched to 60% purity.
The IAEA estimated the stock at 440.9 kilograms before losing the ability to verify material at the affected facilities.
Under the agency’s standard measurement, that quantity — if enriched further — contained enough material for multiple nuclear weapons.
The important qualification is that enriched uranium is not itself a nuclear weapon.
Producing a weapon would require additional enrichment and weaponization steps.
But the stockpile substantially reduces the amount of enrichment work required compared with starting from natural or low-enriched uranium.
That makes its location and condition one of the most important unanswered questions surrounding Iran’s program.
As of September 2026, the IAEA says it has still been unable to restore full verification at the facilities affected by U.S. and Israeli attacks.
The agency has warned that its loss of “continuity of knowledge” regarding Iran’s nuclear material represents a serious proliferation concern.
This uncertainty prevents outside observers from making highly precise claims about Iran’s current nuclear timeline.
U.S. Intelligence Has Offered a More Cautious Assessment
American intelligence reporting has not fully matched the more expansive Israeli assessment presented by Steinitz.
Reuters reported in May that U.S. intelligence agencies assessed Iran’s nuclear weapons timeline as broadly unchanged from the estimate established after the 2025 strikes.
According to sources familiar with those assessments, the earlier attacks had potentially pushed Iran’s timeline to a nuclear weapon to approximately nine to twelve months, or up to a year.
Further attacks beginning in February 2026 had inflicted additional damage, but U.S. assessments concluded that they had not fundamentally changed that timeline.
One reason was the believed survival of much of Iran’s highly enriched uranium.
This creates an important analytical distinction.
Israel may have substantially damaged the infrastructure required to operate an industrial-scale nuclear program.
But if Tehran retains enriched nuclear material, technical knowledge and the ability to construct smaller or concealed facilities, physical destruction alone may not translate directly into a multi-year nuclear delay.
Both propositions can be true simultaneously.
Infrastructure Can Be Destroyed Faster Than Nuclear Knowledge
One of the fundamental challenges in assessing military action against a nuclear program is that knowledge is difficult to eliminate.
Iran has spent decades developing expertise in uranium enrichment, centrifuge manufacturing, nuclear engineering and related technologies.
Destroyed facilities can potentially be reconstructed.
Machinery can eventually be replaced.
Specialized knowledge is harder to remove permanently.
This is why assessments of nuclear setbacks generally depend on more than visible destruction.
Analysts must consider how many centrifuges survived, whether manufacturing capability remains available, where enriched material is stored, which scientists and engineers remain active, and whether Tehran has undeclared or deeply buried infrastructure that survived the campaign.
One area receiving renewed attention is the fortified underground complex near Natanz often referred to as Pickaxe Mountain.
In September, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly raised the possibility of further military action against the site, reflecting continuing concern that deeply buried Iranian nuclear infrastructure may remain relevant.
The IAEA’s Loss of Access Is Now a Strategic Problem
The uncertainty is amplified by the deterioration of international monitoring.
The IAEA has been unable to return to several nuclear sites hit by U.S. and Israeli forces and has repeatedly sought information from Tehran about the status of declared nuclear material.
By September, the dispute had escalated significantly.
The IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran to the United Nations Security Council over its non-proliferation obligations, including unresolved questions surrounding nuclear material and the lack of inspector access.
Iran rejected the move as politically motivated and has maintained that its nuclear activities are peaceful.
The inspection gap has strategic consequences.
When inspectors cannot physically verify nuclear material, policymakers become more dependent on intelligence collection, satellite imagery and estimates.
Those tools can provide substantial information about infrastructure.
They are less reliable for determining the precise location and condition of movable nuclear material.
The longer the verification gap persists, the greater the uncertainty becomes.
“Breakout Time” and “Time to a Weapon” Are Not the Same Thing
Public debate around Iran frequently uses the terms interchangeably, but they describe different stages.
Nuclear breakout generally refers to the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear device.
A functioning nuclear weapon requires additional steps.
Those can include further technical work necessary to transform nuclear material into a weaponized system capable of reliable delivery.
That distinction helps explain why different officials can produce apparently contradictory timelines without necessarily measuring the same thing.
Prior to the attacks, Iran’s large 60%-enriched uranium stockpile meant that the additional enrichment required to reach weapons-grade levels could potentially be completed relatively quickly.
But possession of weapons-grade material would not automatically mean possession of an operational nuclear weapon.
For Jerusalem Africa, the terminology should therefore remain precise.
Claims that Iran was “months from a bomb” should always be attributed to the official or intelligence assessment making that judgment.
The Nuclear Issue Has Not Disappeared from the War
The military campaign has weakened parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but the nuclear question remains central to the continuing U.S.-Iran confrontation.
Washington continues to insist that Tehran cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Iran continues to deny that it seeks one.
At the same time, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have become intertwined with the wider conflict involving sanctions, energy exports, the Strait of Hormuz and regional military operations.
By September, U.S. and Iranian officials were again engaged in mediated diplomatic contacts even as military confrontation continued elsewhere.
This means the surviving nuclear program is not merely a technical issue.
It is also one of Tehran’s most important bargaining assets.
Iran’s remaining stock of highly enriched uranium has already emerged as a central point in negotiations, with Washington seeking arrangements that would prevent the material from providing Tehran with a rapid route toward weapons-grade enrichment.
Regional Implications Extend Beyond Iran and Israel
The uncertainty surrounding Iran’s nuclear capability affects the wider Middle East.
Gulf states must calculate whether Iran retains the ability to reconstruct its program rapidly.
Israel must decide whether the existing damage provides sufficient strategic distance from the nuclear threat or whether further action may eventually be required.
The United States faces a related question: whether military pressure can produce a durable non-proliferation outcome without a verifiable diplomatic arrangement.
There is also a broader proliferation concern.
If regional governments conclude that Iran retains a latent nuclear capability despite repeated military attacks and diplomatic pressure, that could influence their own long-term security calculations.
For broader Jerusalem Africa coverage, see the Israel Security and Geopolitics sections.
Strategic Assessment: The Damage Is Clear, the Timeline Is Not
Three conclusions can currently be supported with reasonable confidence.
First, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has suffered significant damage.
Enrichment and nuclear-related facilities have been repeatedly struck, imposing real physical and technical costs on Tehran.
Second, claims that Iran has been pushed two to four years from a nuclear weapon remain assessments rather than independently verified facts.
Steinitz presented that timeline publicly, while U.S. intelligence reporting has indicated a considerably shorter potential setback.
Third, the unresolved enriched uranium stockpile is now central to any assessment of the Iranian nuclear threat.
Until the IAEA regains meaningful access or reliable information establishes the location and condition of that material, precise estimates of Iran’s nuclear timeline should be treated cautiously.
The key indicators for Jerusalem Africa to monitor are therefore clear:
Restoration of IAEA inspections at damaged facilities.
Verification of Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stockpile.
Reconstruction activity at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan.
Activity at deeply buried nuclear sites.
Evidence of renewed centrifuge manufacturing or enrichment.
U.S.-Iran negotiations over the remaining enriched material.
Any revision to U.S., Israeli or IAEA assessments of Iran’s nuclear timeline.
The military campaign unquestionably changed Iran’s nuclear program.
What it has not yet produced is certainty.
The critical distinction is between destroying nuclear infrastructure and eliminating nuclear capability. The first can be observed in damaged facilities. The second cannot yet be demonstrated with the same confidence.