Terrorism and Military Activities Escalate in the Sahel Region
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
The Sahel region has been plagued by terrorism and instability for years, with groups such as the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) operating in the area. The region has also seen a significant military presence, with countries such as France, the United States, and Burkina Faso conducting operations against terrorist groups. Recently, the region has experienced an escalation of violence, with multiple attacks and military operations reported in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Sahel States Expand Military Capacity as Jihadist Groups Sustain Pressure
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are expanding troop numbers, military cooperation and counter-terrorism capabilities, but the continued operational reach of JNIM and Islamic State-linked groups shows that greater militarization has not yet translated into decisive control of the central Sahel.
The central Sahel is entering a new phase of its security crisis.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are investing heavily in manpower, military training, intelligence and regional defence cooperation as their governments attempt to regain territory from jihadist organizations.
At the same time, the principal armed groups confronting them are demonstrating greater geographic reach and an increasing ability to strike military infrastructure, transport corridors and even high-value installations in national capitals.
According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9,928 fatalities linked to militant Islamist organizations were recorded in the Sahel during the 12 months ending in mid-2026 — more than in any other region of Africa and approximately 42% of the continent-wide total.
The military build-up is therefore occurring against a difficult reality: states are expanding their security apparatus, but the insurgency remains capable of adapting.
JNIM Has Become the Dominant Militant Force
The most important armed actor across much of the central Sahel is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM.
The al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition accounted for approximately 76% of fatalities linked to militant Islamist organizations in the Sahel during the most recent reporting period, according to the Africa Center.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara — increasingly referred to as Islamic State Sahel Province — accounted for another 19%.
The two organizations do not operate identically.
JNIM has built a broad network stretching across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and increasingly uses attacks on military installations, road networks and economic infrastructure to weaken state authority.
Islamic State-linked forces remain particularly active in border regions, including western Niger and northeastern Mali, and have demonstrated a high level of violence against civilians.
Together, the groups are creating overlapping security challenges across a territory that national armies have struggled to control.
Mali Demonstrates the Scale of the Threat
Recent events in Mali illustrate the military pressure confronting Sahel governments.
On September 10, JNIM fighters attacked a Malian military camp in Dioura in central Mali. Sources cited by Reuters said more than 100 Malian soldiers were killed, while more than 100 personnel were reportedly captured.
Malian forces subsequently launched a major air-and-ground counter-operation.
JNIM has also targeted strategically important military infrastructure.
The group claimed attacks against air-defence systems at Sévaré airport, where Malian military aircraft and drones operate, while the area experienced repeated shelling.
Earlier in 2026, insurgents mounted coordinated attacks across multiple areas of Mali, including locations in the north, centre and south.
The geographic spread is significant.
An insurgency once primarily associated with northern and central Mali is increasingly capable of threatening routes and military positions across a much wider portion of the country.
For related Jerusalem Africa coverage, see the Counter-Terror section.
Niger Has Faced Attacks on the Capital’s Airport
Niger is experiencing a similar expansion of the threat.
On June 18, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on Diori Hamani International Airport and the adjoining military airbase in Niamey.
The Nigerien government said 11 members of the security forces and two civilians were killed, while security forces killed 22 attackers.
The attack was particularly significant because the same airport complex had already been targeted earlier in the year by the regional Islamic State affiliate.
That means both of the Sahel’s principal jihadist networks demonstrated the ability to challenge one of Niger’s most strategically important sites during 2026.
An attack on a military installation inside a national capital carries a different strategic meaning from an ambush in a remote border region.
It demonstrates an ability to penetrate defensive layers and forces governments to allocate resources to protecting key infrastructure far from traditional insurgent strongholds.
Burkina Faso Is Responding with a Major Expansion of Its Security Forces
Burkina Faso is pursuing one of the region’s most ambitious military mobilization programmes.
Security is the first pillar of the government’s Plan RELANCE 2026–2030, which defines national security and social cohesion as prerequisites for the country’s wider economic and political development.
Under the plan presented to lawmakers in May, authorities announced ambitions to recruit and train more than 50,000 additional members of the defence and security forces, add approximately 60,000 Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland, or VDPs, and develop a reserve exceeding 100,000 personnel.
The scale is noteworthy.
If implemented, the programme would substantially increase the number of personnel available for territorial security, local defence and military operations.
The government also plans to strengthen intelligence capabilities, expand urban video surveillance, develop a domestic defence industry and deepen military cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States.
A separate government decision in April outlined plans to organize a pool of 100,000 trained reservists capable of mobilization when required.
This represents more than an expansion of the regular army.
Burkina Faso is attempting to construct a broader national defence ecosystem involving professional forces, civilian auxiliaries, reserves, intelligence capabilities and domestic military production.
Bangré I Shows a Shift Toward Higher-Intensity Training
Burkina Faso is also adapting how its forces train.
From May 4 to May 8, the military conducted Bangré I, a large combined-arms exercise involving more than 1,800 participants.
The exercise brought together 208 officer cadets, 1,318 non-commissioned officer cadets and approximately 300 soldiers from specialized units.
Participating forces included elements of the Bataillon Blindé d’Intervention Rapide, or BBIR; the Bataillon d’Artillerie de Campagne et d’Intervention Rapide, or BACIR; military engineers; helicopter support from the air force; and special-forces personnel.
Importantly, Bangré I should not be described as a counter-terrorism operation.
It was a training exercise focused on combined-arms manoeuvre and high-intensity warfare.
Its relevance lies in what it reveals about Burkina Faso’s military transformation.
The armed forces are preparing not only for dispersed counter-insurgency missions but also for operations requiring armour, artillery, aviation, engineers and special forces to operate together.
That suggests Ouagadougou is attempting to develop capabilities beyond the lighter security model traditionally associated with Sahel counter-terrorism.
The AES Is Building a New Regional Security Architecture
The national military build-ups are occurring alongside a wider transformation of regional security cooperation.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have consolidated their partnership through the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, after breaking with previous Western-led security arrangements.
In July 2026, Russia and the three AES governments pledged to deepen military and military-technical cooperation, including support for the armed forces of the three states and their emerging unified force.
Russia’s Africa Corps has become particularly important in Mali, where Russian personnel operate alongside government forces.
This marks a substantial change from the earlier phase of the Sahel conflict, when France and other Western partners played a central operational role.
The current model increasingly rests on national military governments, AES coordination and Russian security support.
Whether that model produces better outcomes remains unresolved.
The persistence of large-scale attacks despite increased military cooperation shows that changing partners does not by itself eliminate the structural challenges that have allowed armed organizations to expand.
More Troops Do Not Automatically Produce More Territorial Control
The scale of Burkina Faso’s mobilization highlights a wider question across the Sahel.
Expanding troop numbers can allow governments to defend more towns, roads and military installations.
But counter-insurgency depends on more than manpower.
Forces need logistics, intelligence, air support, mobility, command structures and reliable supply chains. They also need sufficient training and discipline to operate among civilian populations.
The rapid expansion of auxiliary and reserve formations can therefore create both opportunities and risks.
Volunteers with strong local knowledge can improve intelligence and help secure communities that regular forces cannot permanently occupy.
But poorly trained or weakly supervised auxiliary forces can also contribute to civilian abuses and communal grievances.
The latter is not merely a humanitarian problem.
It can become a security problem if militant organizations exploit abuses to recruit new members or portray themselves as defenders of targeted communities.
The Africa Center has reported that military forces in Mali and Burkina Faso, together with their Russian partners, have been linked to substantial civilian fatalities, warning that such violence can contribute to militant recruitment.
The strategic test is therefore not simply how many personnel governments can mobilize.
It is whether they can convert those personnel into effective and disciplined territorial control.
The Humanitarian Cost Continues to Grow
The military contest is occurring alongside one of the world's largest displacement crises.
UNHCR reported that the number of forcibly displaced people across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger had reached approximately 3.8 million by July 31, 2026, nearly double the level recorded in 2020.
More than 818,000 of those people were refugees or asylum-seekers.
The humanitarian consequences extend beyond displacement.
Conflict disrupts schools, agriculture, trade routes and access to health services while placing additional pressure on towns hosting displaced populations.
OCHA estimates that 24.3 million people across its wider Sahel humanitarian response area will require humanitarian assistance and protection during 2026.
This creates a feedback loop.
Insecurity weakens local economies and public services.
Weak state presence can then make isolated communities more vulnerable to militant influence, recruitment and coercion.
Military success that is not followed by functioning administration and services may therefore prove temporary.
The Threat Is Moving Beyond Traditional Battlefields
Another important trend is the changing geography of militant activity.
JNIM has expanded toward western and southern Mali, while armed networks have increased activity around the border zones connecting Burkina Faso, Niger and coastal West African states.
The Africa Center reports that Sahel-based militant networks have also established links and operational activity in northwestern Nigeria.
This matters because the security challenge is no longer confined to the historical Mali–Burkina Faso–Niger triangle.
The insurgency increasingly intersects with economic corridors and border regions connecting the Sahel to Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria.
For militants, these corridors can provide revenue, supplies and new operational space.
For governments, they create a requirement for security cooperation beyond the AES itself.
For broader regional coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Geopolitics and Military sections.
Strategic Assessment: The Sahel Is Entering a Race Between Military Expansion and Insurgent Adaptation
The central trend in the Sahel is not simply “more terrorism.”
It is an accelerating competition between state military expansion and insurgent adaptation.
Burkina Faso is dramatically increasing the size and structure of its security apparatus.
Mali is combining national forces with Russian military support.
Niger is defending critical infrastructure against attacks by both JNIM and Islamic State-linked networks.
The AES is attempting to turn those national efforts into a regional security architecture.
At the same time, militant organizations are changing how and where they operate.
JNIM is striking large military positions and economic corridors. Islamic State-linked forces remain entrenched in strategic border regions. Both have shown an ability to challenge government forces despite years of counter-terrorism operations.
The indicators worth watching are therefore concrete:
Territorial control. Can governments maintain permanent access to areas recovered during military operations?
Force integration. Can Burkina Faso successfully absorb tens of thousands of additional troops, volunteers and reservists without sacrificing training and command standards?
AES capability. Does the alliance’s unified force develop into an operational cross-border formation or remain primarily a political project?
Russian involvement. Does Africa Corps expand its combat role as pressure on Mali and its neighbours increases?
Militant geography. Do JNIM and Islamic State-linked organizations continue moving toward major cities, economic corridors and coastal West Africa?
Civilian security. Do military operations reduce violence against communities, or do abuses and displacement continue to create conditions that armed groups can exploit?
The scale of the military response across the Sahel is increasing rapidly.
So is the sophistication of the forces it is intended to defeat.
The strategic question is no longer whether Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are willing to mobilize more forces. It is whether those forces can produce durable security faster than JNIM and Islamic State-linked networks can adapt, disperse and expand.