Israel and Iran: Rising Tensions in the Middle East
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
The recent escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran has sparked concerns of a potential conflict in the region, with former Mossad official Oded Eilam highlighting the complexities of the situation. According to Eilam, the upcoming World Cup has created a political deadline for US President Trump, who seeks to avoid a surge in oil prices and a global crisis.
Israel-Iran Rivalry Enters New Phase as U.S.-Iran Diplomacy Faces a New Political Clock
The World Cup deadline that shaped Israeli analysis earlier in 2026 has passed. The strategic pressure has not. With direct Israeli-Iranian strikes paused, Washington and Tehran are now testing whether economic pressure, control of the Strait of Hormuz and the approaching U.S. midterm elections can produce a diplomatic exit — or another cycle of escalation.
The strategic clock surrounding Iran has changed.
In May 2026, former senior Mossad official Oded Ailam argued that the approaching FIFA World Cup created an important political constraint for U.S. President Donald Trump.
Ailam, now a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, argued that a major Gulf confrontation during a global sporting event hosted partly in the United States could destabilize oil markets, create political costs and increase pressure on Washington to seek a rapid outcome with Tehran.
That analysis belonged to a specific moment.
The World Cup began on June 11 and ended on July 19. It can no longer be treated as the principal political deadline shaping American policy.
But the broader logic identified by Ailam remains relevant: U.S. policy toward Iran is being shaped not only by military calculations, but also by energy prices, domestic politics and the cost of a prolonged regional confrontation.
Today, the more relevant political date is November 3 — the U.S. congressional midterm elections.
Direct Israel-Iran Fighting Has Paused, Not Disappeared
Israel and Iran halted direct attacks against each other on June 8 after a brief renewed exchange of strikes and an intervention by President Trump.
Iran had launched missiles toward Israel following Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel responded with strikes on Iranian military and petrochemical targets.
Both sides subsequently stopped their direct attacks, although Tehran warned that renewed major Israeli action against Hezbollah could trigger another response.
That distinction is important.
The current situation should not be described simply as Israel and Iran moving toward another immediate direct war.
Instead, the rivalry is operating through several interconnected theatres: Lebanon, the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian nuclear infrastructure and the continuing confrontation between Iran and the United States.
Israel therefore remains a central participant in the regional balance even when Israeli and Iranian forces are not directly exchanging fire.
For continuing coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Israel Security section.
The U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Become the Immediate Strategic Centre
The centre of military pressure has increasingly shifted toward the United States and Iran.
The confrontation has continued for months despite intermittent ceasefire efforts and diplomatic contacts.
As of September 24, U.S. and Iranian negotiators in New York were discussing a possible phased arrangement that could involve Tehran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Washington easing its economic blockade.
The discussions remain difficult because both sides possess leverage they are reluctant to surrender.
Washington controls much of the economic pressure now affecting Tehran.
Iran, meanwhile, retains the ability to disrupt access through one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
This produces a bargaining structure in which the instruments pushing the two sides toward negotiations are also preventing compromise.
The United States wants pressure to generate Iranian concessions.
Iran wants meaningful pressure removed before giving up its principal leverage.
The New Political Clock Is the U.S. Midterm Election
The World Cup has been replaced by another political calendar.
The U.S. congressional midterm elections are scheduled for November 3.
President Trump has suggested that a broader agreement with Iran may come after the vote, while current negotiations have raised the possibility that both sides could have incentives to reach at least a partial arrangement earlier.
Energy prices are one reason.
A reopening of the Strait of Hormuz could reduce pressure on oil markets and potentially ease politically sensitive fuel costs in the United States.
The connection between foreign policy and domestic economics has become particularly visible as the conflict has disrupted crude supplies and contributed to higher fuel prices.
Reuters reported in September that record diesel prices had become a significant economic and political problem in the United States as the Iran conflict and other disruptions constrained global refining capacity.
The political calendar should not be interpreted as proof that Washington will necessarily compromise.
It does, however, create incentives that both Tehran and U.S. officials understand.
Iran Is Under Severe Economic Pressure — but “Collapse” Is Too Strong
Earlier assessments frequently described Iran as approaching economic collapse.
Current evidence supports a more precise conclusion.
The Iranian economy is under extremely severe pressure, particularly because of restrictions on oil exports.
Iranian crude loadings fell from approximately 2 million barrels per day in March to roughly 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August after the U.S. naval blockade sharply reduced Tehran’s ability to export through regional waters.
Oil remains a critical source of foreign currency for the Iranian state.
Iran’s currency has also experienced intense pressure.
By early September, the rial had fallen beyond 2 million to the U.S. dollar, while inflation reached approximately 66% in July. IMF projections cited by Reuters suggested inflation could approach 70% during 2026.
But economic crisis is not synonymous with imminent state collapse.
Iranian officials maintain that the country retains sufficient foreign-currency reserves and that the government can continue supporting financial markets.
Those claims cannot be independently verified in full, but they are another reason to avoid presenting collapse as an established outcome.
The stronger assessment is that Tehran is facing an increasingly expensive choice between prolonged confrontation and an agreement that could require politically difficult concessions.
Hormuz Has Become Iran’s Most Important Bargaining Tool
The Strait of Hormuz is central to that choice.
For decades, Iran’s ability to threaten navigation through Hormuz has been viewed as one of its most important asymmetric capabilities.
The 2026 conflict has transformed that theoretical leverage into an active element of the confrontation.
Commercial traffic has been heavily disrupted, shipping costs have risen and regional oil producers have been forced to develop expensive alternatives to normal Gulf export routes.
Ship-to-ship transfer operations near Oman were moving approximately 2.5 million barrels per day in September, compared with 1.4 million in August, according to Reuters analysis.
Freight costs for some large crude carriers exceeded $30 per barrel.
Iran has now indicated that it could reopen Hormuz if Washington eases military pressure and lifts its blockade.
That makes the waterway more than a battlefield.
It has become a negotiating asset.
Oil Prices Remain Part of the Escalation Equation
Ailam’s original analysis placed significant emphasis on energy markets.
That part of the argument has become more relevant rather than less.
Oil prices continue to react quickly to military and diplomatic developments in the Gulf.
On September 24, prices rose approximately 3% after a Houthi missile attack on Saudi Arabia renewed concerns over regional supply disruptions.
Earlier diplomatic signals around Hormuz had pushed prices in the opposite direction.
This illustrates how the conflict affects strategic calculations far beyond Iran and Israel.
Washington must consider the domestic economic impact of sustained high energy prices.
Gulf governments must protect export infrastructure.
Asian economies depend heavily on Gulf energy supplies.
Iran understands that disruption creates international pressure for de-escalation.
The result is a situation in which oil markets themselves have become part of the strategic environment.
Israel Has Different Priorities from Washington
Israel and the United States overlap on several objectives regarding Iran, but their priorities are not identical.
Israel remains focused on Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities and support for Hezbollah and other armed organizations.
Washington must consider those issues while also managing freedom of navigation, energy markets, U.S. forces across the region, domestic economic pressures and the possibility of a prolonged war.
Those differences became visible in June.
Reuters reported that Trump pressed Israel to halt renewed strikes against Iran in order to protect U.S.-Iran negotiations, while Israel sought to ensure that its security interests were not excluded from any wider settlement.
For Israel, one particularly sensitive issue is Lebanon.
Iran has warned Washington that major Israeli operations against Hezbollah could provoke an Iranian response. In September, Tehran specifically warned against a major Israeli offensive around the Ali al-Taher ridge in southern Lebanon.
This means any U.S.-Iran agreement would need to coexist with an unresolved Israel-Hezbollah confrontation.
A diplomatic settlement in the Gulf does not automatically stabilize Lebanon.
The “Karbala” Framework Requires Caution
Ailam also argued in his May analysis that elements of Iran’s leadership operate within an ideological framework influenced by the symbolism of Karbala — the foundational Shi’ite narrative of sacrifice associated with the death of Imam Hussein.
The concept is relevant to Iranian political rhetoric.
The Islamic Republic has repeatedly used themes of martyrdom, resistance and sacrifice in official discourse, particularly during periods of conflict.
But ideology should not be treated as a deterministic model for Iranian decision-making.
Iranian leaders have also demonstrated pragmatic behaviour when regime survival, economic conditions or military balance required compromise.
Current negotiations over Hormuz are themselves evidence that ideological rhetoric and practical bargaining can coexist.
For analytical purposes, religious symbolism is therefore one variable among several — alongside military capability, economic pressure, internal stability and regime survival.
It should not be used to assume that Tehran will automatically choose escalation over compromise.
Gulf States Are Seeking Stability Without Accepting Iranian Control
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf governments face their own strategic dilemma.
They want to avoid a wider U.S.-Iran confrontation that could expose energy infrastructure, ports and cities to attack.
At the same time, they oppose giving Iran lasting control over navigation through Hormuz.
During discussions in New York, Gulf leaders reportedly urged Washington to clarify its long-term strategy and rejected the idea that Iran should be allowed to turn access to the strait into a permanent instrument of coercion.
This creates a regional preference for de-escalation without capitulation.
The Gulf states want a political arrangement.
They also want commercial navigation restored independently of Iranian political conditions.
Why the Conflict Matters for Africa
The consequences extend beyond the Middle East.
African states are exposed to the conflict primarily through energy, shipping and trade.
Countries that import substantial quantities of refined fuels are vulnerable to higher crude and diesel prices.
Disruption around Hormuz and the Red Sea can also increase freight and insurance costs for trade between Asia, the Gulf, East Africa and Europe.
The impact will not be uniform.
Oil-producing African states may benefit from higher crude prices in the short term.
Net energy importers can face higher transport costs, pressure on foreign-exchange reserves and greater inflation.
For Jerusalem Africa, the relevant African dimension is therefore not that the continent is a direct participant in the Israel-Iran confrontation.
It is that a prolonged Gulf crisis can transmit economic pressure into African markets through energy prices, shipping routes and supply chains.
For broader regional analysis, see Jerusalem Africa’s Geopolitics coverage.
Strategic Assessment: The Deadline Changed, the Underlying Pressure Did Not
Oded Ailam’s May analysis was built around a political deadline that has now passed.
The 2026 World Cup ended on July 19.
But the broader interaction he identified between American politics, energy markets and military decision-making remains relevant.
The variables have changed.
The U.S. midterm elections have replaced the World Cup as the immediate domestic political milestone.
The U.S. blockade has replaced sanctions alone as the principal source of economic pressure on Tehran.
Hormuz has evolved from a latent Iranian threat into an active bargaining instrument.
And direct Israel-Iran fighting has paused while the U.S.-Iran confrontation has become the principal military and diplomatic arena.
Several indicators now deserve close attention:
U.S.-Iran negotiations.
Whether the talks in New York produce an initial Hormuz-for-blockade arrangement will indicate whether both sides are prepared to trade leverage for de-escalation.
Strait of Hormuz traffic.
A sustained reopening would reduce immediate pressure on global energy markets and weaken one of the conflict’s largest economic risks.
Iranian oil exports.
A recovery would provide Tehran with financial breathing room; continued suppression would intensify economic pressure.
Israel-Hezbollah escalation.
Major fighting in Lebanon remains one of the clearest routes through which Israel and Iran could again enter direct confrontation.
Iran’s nuclear program.
Any diplomatic arrangement that leaves nuclear questions unresolved may reduce immediate hostilities without resolving the strategic dispute.
The November 3 U.S. midterms.
The election does not mechanically determine American policy, but it changes the political incentives surrounding fuel prices, war costs and diplomatic timing.
The strategic question is therefore no longer whether Trump can reach an agreement before the World Cup.
That moment has passed.
The question now is whether Washington and Tehran can convert their remaining leverage into a sustainable arrangement before economic pressure and regional military escalation close the diplomatic window again.