South Sudan’s President Dissolves Government Ahead of First Post‑Independence Elections
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
Salva Kiir has dissolved South Sudan’s transitional unity government ahead of December elections, ending the 2018 power-sharing structure as concerns over credibility, security and opposition participation persist.
South Sudan Ends Unity Government as First Post-Independence Election Nears
President Salva Kiir has dismantled the transitional power-sharing government created by South Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement, placing the country under a caretaker administration three months before elections scheduled for December 22. The move clears a formal path toward the vote — but also removes a political structure designed to prevent renewed conflict.
South Sudan has entered the final and potentially most difficult phase of a political transition that has lasted for most of the country’s independent history.
On September 22, President Salva Kiir dissolved the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, removed the country’s vice presidents and cabinet, and ended the mandate of national and state legislatures ahead of general elections scheduled for December 22. A caretaker administration has been appointed to govern during the electoral period.
The vote, if held as scheduled, would be South Sudan’s first national election since the country became independent in 2011.
It would also formally end the political architecture established after the civil war — a system that brought former rivals into the same government but never fully resolved the military and political divisions between them.
The central question is therefore not simply whether South Sudan can organize an election.
It is whether an election can replace the peace agreement as the country’s principal source of political legitimacy without reopening the conflicts that agreement was designed to contain.
A Government Built to End a Civil War Is Being Dismantled
The unity government emerged from the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.
The agreement sought to end a civil war that had begun in 2013 and had pitted forces loyal to Kiir against those associated with his long-time rival Riek Machar.
Its political solution was deliberately inclusive.
Kiir remained president, Machar became First Vice President, additional vice-presidential posts were distributed among other political blocs, and ministries and legislative seats were shared among the parties to the peace agreement.
The arrangement was intended to last until elections created a new government with an electoral mandate.
But that transition was repeatedly extended.
Key components of the agreement — including security-sector unification, constitutional reform, electoral preparations and the return or resettlement of displaced populations — remained incomplete years after the agreement was signed.
The September 22 dissolution therefore ends a transitional structure before all of the objectives associated with that transition have been completed.
The Rules Were Changed to Make the December Vote Possible
The dissolution did not occur in isolation.
In the weeks before the government was disbanded, South Sudanese authorities changed the legal framework governing the election.
The 2018 peace agreement originally envisaged elections following the adoption of a permanent constitution and the completion of a national population census.
Those requirements became major obstacles because neither process was completed.
In September, constitutional and electoral amendments separated the December election from both the permanent constitution process and the census. The amended legislation allows the vote to proceed without either requirement being fulfilled.
Reuters reported that the changes were designed to clear legal hurdles that had contributed to repeated election delays.
For Kiir’s government, the argument is straightforward: another postponement would prolong a transition that has already lasted far beyond its original timetable.
Critics and international observers, however, have focused on a different question — whether removing unresolved prerequisites makes the election possible at the cost of making it less credible.
The African Union said in August that elections should take place by December without another extension, but simultaneously called for an inclusive dialogue, adequate funding, implementation of security arrangements and a realistic electoral roadmap.
Riek Machar’s Removal Formalizes a Political Rupture That Began Earlier
The dismissal of Riek Machar is politically significant, but it did not begin on September 22.
Machar had already been under house arrest since March 2025 following escalating clashes between government forces and armed groups associated with his political constituency.
He was later charged with crimes including treason, murder and crimes against humanity over alleged links to attacks by the Nuer-dominated White Army militia. Machar and his SPLM-IO party reject the allegations and have described the proceedings as politically motivated.
His detention had already placed the 2018 peace settlement under severe strain.
United Nations officials warned that the confrontation around Machar, continued fighting between rival forces and the incomplete implementation of the peace agreement were pushing the country toward a dangerous political threshold.
The dissolution of the unity government now removes the institutional framework in which Kiir and Machar were formally required to govern together.
That could simplify decision-making in Juba.
It also reduces one of the political mechanisms designed to keep former armed rivals inside the state rather than outside it.
The Election Machinery Is Moving — but It Is Late
There are signs of genuine electoral preparation.
The National Elections Commission has been training state-level election officials and preparing for voter registration across South Sudan’s ten states and three administrative areas.
But as recently as early September, voter registration had not yet begun.
The commission issued a public statement saying that no registration data existed because registration centres and the formal registration period had not yet been announced.
That leaves a compressed timetable before December 22.
Organizing a credible national vote requires far more than printing ballots.
Authorities must register voters, establish polling locations, train election staff, distribute material across a country with limited infrastructure, provide security and allow political parties to campaign.
Those challenges are particularly difficult in areas affected by armed conflict or mass displacement.
The United Nations Security Council was told in August that although 39 political parties had been registered and civic education had begun, important legal, security, financial and political questions remained unresolved.
Kiir Is Moving From Transitional President to Election Candidate
The election will also change the political status of Salva Kiir himself.
Kiir has led South Sudan since independence and chaired the transitional political system throughout the post-war period.
His ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement has identified him as its presidential candidate for the December election, and party organizations have publicly endorsed his candidacy.
He will not necessarily run unopposed.
The National Patriotic Movement, for example, has endorsed lawyer Issa Muzamil Sebit Makelele as its presidential candidate. Other political figures have also indicated plans to contest the vote.
The political environment, however, is highly asymmetric.
Kiir enters the campaign as incumbent president and leader of the dominant ruling party, while the opposition associated with Machar remains fragmented and its principal leader has been detained and prosecuted.
Opposition politicians have already questioned whether the caretaker administration appointed by Kiir can oversee the electoral period impartially, particularly because some officials from the previous political establishment remain involved.
The government says the caretaker structure is legally grounded and necessary to manage the country during the electoral transition.
The Peace Agreement Is Giving Way to Electoral Politics Before Security Reform Is Complete
One of the most serious unresolved issues lies outside the election commission.
The 2018 settlement called for the unification and deployment of forces previously loyal to different political and military factions.
That process remains incomplete.
The African Union again called in August for the training and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces and wider security-sector reforms, describing them as critical to maintaining the permanent ceasefire.
This matters because elections can increase political competition precisely when control over armed forces remains fragmented.
Disputes over results become significantly more dangerous when political movements retain relationships with separate armed formations.
South Sudan has experienced this dynamic before.
The dispute between Kiir and Machar after independence escalated into civil war in 2013, and fighting resumed again in 2016 despite an earlier peace arrangement.
The December election will therefore test not only political institutions but also whether armed actors accept electoral competition as a replacement for military bargaining.
A Humanitarian Crisis Will Shadow the Campaign
The election will also take place against an exceptionally difficult humanitarian backdrop.
The World Food Programme reported in September that around 7.8 million people in South Sudan were struggling with acute food insecurity, while approximately 2.2 million children required urgent nutrition support.
More than 2.5 million people are internally displaced, according to United Nations reporting from 2026.
South Sudan has also absorbed hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the war in neighbouring Sudan, adding pressure to communities and humanitarian systems already operating with limited resources.
Funding shortages are severe.
WFP and UNHCR warned in August that more than 650,000 refugees and asylum seekers inside South Sudan risked losing food and other assistance as humanitarian funding ran out.
These conditions matter politically.
Displacement can make voter registration difficult.
Food insecurity can restrict movement.
Armed violence can prevent campaigning and polling in contested regions.
And unequal access to state resources can affect perceptions of whether the election is genuinely competitive.
Juba Is Trying to Build Political Consensus in the Final Three Months
The dissolution has not ended political negotiations.
On September 24, two days after disbanding the transitional government, Kiir opened an inter-party dialogue in Juba focused on the electoral roadmap.
The meeting brought together political parties, caretaker officials, former vice presidents, diplomats, religious leaders and civil society representatives. The government presented the dialogue as an effort to build agreement around the December process.
That initiative will matter because the legal ability to conduct an election and political acceptance of an election are not the same thing.
South Sudan can amend laws, dissolve institutions and set a polling date through formal state authority.
A durable transition requires losing parties and armed constituencies to recognize the outcome as legitimate enough not to return to violence.
That may be the harder part.
What December 22 Will Actually Test
South Sudan’s first post-independence election will be more than a contest for the presidency.
It will test whether a state created through independence and stabilized through negotiated power-sharing can move to electoral competition without reopening the conflicts that shaped its first decade.
Four developments will determine the answer.
The first is political inclusion. The more major opposition factions participate in the process, the harder it becomes to portray the vote as a unilateral replacement for the peace agreement.
The second is security. Elections held while rival political networks retain armed capabilities carry risks that legal reforms alone cannot solve.
The third is electoral readiness. Voter registration, funding, logistics and access to insecure areas will determine whether the December date is operationally realistic.
The fourth is acceptance of the result. Even a technically successful election could destabilize the country if powerful actors reject its legitimacy.
The dissolution of the unity government therefore does not simply clear the way for South Sudan’s first national vote since independence.
It closes one political era before the next has proved that it can function.
The next three months will show whether South Sudan’s long-delayed election can become the end of its transitional period — or whether the dismantling of the 2018 power-sharing system removes safeguards faster than electoral institutions can replace them.
For continuing coverage, see Jerusalem Africa’s Geopolitics and Military sections.
South Sudan Salva Kiir Salva Kiir South Sudan transitional government