Ethiopia’s Regional Balancing Act Faces New Test as Tigray Conflict Returns
Jerusalem Africa Desk ·
Ethiopia’s strategic relevance is rising, reflected in recent internal security developments and expanding technology‑transfer talks with Israel on water and agriculture.
Ethiopia’s Regional Balancing Act Faces New Test as Tigray Conflict Returns
Renewed fighting in Tigray is threatening Ethiopia’s fragile post-war settlement just as Addis Ababa seeks a larger role in Red Sea politics and deeper partnerships in agriculture, technology and water security. The result is a widening gap between Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and its unresolved internal security challenges.
Ethiopia is once again facing the possibility that domestic conflict could reshape its regional position.
On September 23, Tigrayan forces seized control of airports across northern Ethiopia and clashed with federal troops in neighbouring Afar, marking the most serious breakdown yet of the peace framework that ended the 2020–2022 Tigray war.
The developments come at a sensitive moment.
Addis Ababa is simultaneously managing deteriorating relations with Eritrea, pursuing greater access to the Red Sea, confronting armed opposition in several regions and attempting to expand diplomatic and economic partnerships with countries including Israel.
For Ethiopia, the problem is increasingly one of strategic bandwidth.
The government wants to position the country as a major political, economic and security actor in the Horn of Africa.
Renewed internal war could make that ambition significantly more difficult.
Tigray Has Returned to Open Conflict
The most immediate threat comes from northern Ethiopia.
On September 23, Tigrayan forces took control of airports in Mekelle and Shire and reportedly also in Axum, according to multiple sources cited by AFP.
Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to all three airports.
Fighting also erupted between Tigrayan and federal forces in neighbouring Afar, including around Abala and Erebti. AFP reported that Tigrayan forces were also said to have advanced into several other locations, although some of those claims could not be independently confirmed.
The fighting represents a major escalation after months of drone strikes, troop movements and political deterioration.
The federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF, fought a devastating war between 2020 and 2022.
That conflict formally ended with the Pretoria Agreement, negotiated under African Union auspices in November 2022.
The agreement produced an uneasy peace rather than a complete political settlement.
Key provisions remained unresolved, roughly one million people remained displaced, and political divisions inside Tigray deepened over the following years.
By late 2025, sporadic clashes had resumed.
The September offensive now places the future of the peace process in serious doubt.
The Conflict Is No Longer Only About Tigray
One of the most important changes from the previous war is the political environment surrounding the TPLF.
On September 21, the TPLF announced that it had joined six other Ethiopian armed opposition movements in a new coalition seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.
The alliance includes groups with very different ethnic and political backgrounds, among them factions associated with the Amhara Fano movement and the Oromo Liberation Army.
Some of those forces fought against one another during the previous Tigray war.
Their willingness to cooperate now illustrates the extent to which opposition to Addis Ababa has created new tactical alignments.
The alliance should not automatically be treated as a unified national insurgency.
Its members have different territorial claims, political objectives and historical grievances.
Some remain former enemies.
But even limited coordination can complicate the federal government’s security planning by forcing it to manage multiple armed theatres simultaneously.
Ethiopia already faces insurgencies and armed instability in Amhara and Oromia.
Renewed large-scale conflict in Tigray could therefore stretch federal military resources across several fronts.
Eritrea Is the Most Dangerous External Variable
The deterioration in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea makes the renewed Tigray conflict particularly dangerous.
Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces during the 2020–2022 war.
Today, the relationship between Addis Ababa and Asmara has sharply deteriorated.
The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups opposed to Prime Minister Abiy’s administration, including forces connected to Tigray.
Eritrea denies those allegations.
The dispute extends beyond Tigray.
Ethiopia’s demand for reliable access to the Red Sea has become another major source of tension.
Landlocked since Eritrea gained independence in 1993, Ethiopia has increasingly described maritime access as a strategic requirement for its long-term economic and national-security interests.
The Eritrean port of Assab has become particularly sensitive.
Officials in Asmara fear that Ethiopian rhetoric surrounding sea access could eventually translate into pressure on Eritrean territory. Addis Ababa has not publicly declared an intention to seize the port, but repeated Ethiopian statements have increased regional suspicion.
A renewed Tigray war therefore carries risks that did not exist in the same form in 2020.
A local confrontation between Addis Ababa and the TPLF could become entangled with worsening Ethiopia-Eritrea relations.
That would turn an internal Ethiopian conflict into a wider Horn of Africa security crisis.
Ethiopia Is Trying to Diversify Its External Partnerships
Against this deteriorating security background, Addis Ababa has been pursuing a broad diplomatic strategy.
Ethiopia does not appear to be aligning exclusively with one external bloc.
Instead, it has sought economic, security and political relationships with a range of actors, including Gulf states, Türkiye, China, Western governments and Israel.
This is best understood as strategic diversification.
Ethiopia’s size, population, military capabilities and position at the headquarters of the African Union give it diplomatic weight that allows Addis Ababa to maintain relationships with competing international actors.
That approach can provide investment and political flexibility.
It becomes harder to sustain when internal security deteriorates.
Foreign investors require stability.
Development projects depend on predictable transportation and access.
Regional diplomacy requires political attention.
A major internal conflict absorbs all three.
Israel-Ethiopia Relations Are Broadening
Israel has become one of the partners Addis Ababa is seeking to engage across several sectors.
The relationship is not new.
Israel and Ethiopia have maintained decades of diplomatic and development cooperation, including agricultural programmes involving MASHAV, Israel’s international development agency.
What is changing is the breadth of the relationship.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Ethiopia in February 2026 and met Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Taye Atske Selassie.
The meetings focused on expanding cooperation in innovation, trade and other areas of mutual interest.
In September, Israeli Ambassador Avraham Neguise described bilateral ties as expanding across agriculture, health, technology, water, energy and investment.
Israeli companies are already active in Ethiopian agriculture, including fruit and vegetable production, while Israeli technologies and expertise are being introduced into the sector.
The agricultural dimension is strategically relevant because Ethiopia remains highly exposed to climate volatility, drought and food-security pressures.
Water Management Is Emerging as a Key Area of Cooperation
Water may become one of the most significant areas of Israel-Ethiopia cooperation.
Ambassador Neguise said in September that the countries had signed a memorandum of understanding covering areas including efficient water use, technological monitoring of water resources and irrigation development.
Israel has a long history of development cooperation with Ethiopia in irrigation and agriculture.
Earlier MASHAV programmes worked with Ethiopian and international partners to improve smallholder horticulture, irrigation efficiency and climate resilience.
The current relationship therefore builds on an established foundation rather than representing an entirely new initiative.
For Ethiopia, the attraction is practical.
Agriculture remains a central source of employment and economic activity, while climate stress increasingly affects productivity.
Technologies that improve irrigation efficiency, water monitoring and agricultural output can have economic and political significance.
But specific claims that Israeli companies have already launched large desalination or precision-agriculture projects in the Somali and Afar regions should not be treated as established without further documentation.
The evidence currently supports a broader and growing partnership in water and agricultural technology.
Cybersecurity and Technology Are Also Entering the Relationship
The bilateral agenda extends beyond agriculture.
Ambassador Neguise has said that Israel is sharing experience with Ethiopia as the country expands its digital infrastructure and confronts growing cybersecurity requirements.
The embassy has also highlighted cooperation in innovation, health technology, entrepreneurship and investment.
This matters because Ethiopia’s modernization agenda increasingly depends on digital systems.
Telecommunications liberalization, financial technology, digital government platforms and new infrastructure projects all create additional cyber-security requirements.
Israel’s technology sector offers capabilities that Ethiopia can potentially integrate without requiring the type of politically sensitive large-scale military alliance that would constrain Addis Ababa’s wider diplomatic flexibility.
That fits Ethiopia’s broader preference for issue-specific partnerships.
Internal War Could Undermine the Development Agenda
The return of large-scale fighting in Tigray directly threatens this strategy.
Airports are particularly important in a country where long distances and uneven infrastructure already complicate logistics.
The loss of normal operations at Mekelle, Shire and Axum affects more than passenger travel.
It can restrict humanitarian access, business activity and movement of personnel and supplies.
Residents in Tigray were already stocking food and withdrawing cash on September 24 amid fears that the region could return to conditions similar to those experienced during the previous war.
Those fears reflect the scale of the earlier conflict.
Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, according to estimates cited by international and African Union officials, while infrastructure and economic activity across northern Ethiopia suffered enormous damage.
A return to prolonged warfare would therefore create development costs extending far beyond Tigray itself.
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambitions Raise the Regional Stakes
The internal crisis is unfolding as the Red Sea becomes increasingly strategic.
Shipping disruption associated with the conflict in Yemen and Houthi military activity has increased international attention on Bab el-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea.
European governments are expanding discussions over naval protection of commercial shipping, while states around the Horn are reassessing the strategic value of ports and coastal access.
For landlocked Ethiopia, this strengthens the argument that dependable maritime access is an economic-security requirement.
But it also makes the question more politically sensitive.
Eritrea views Assab through the lens of sovereignty.
Somalia has previously objected to Ethiopian agreements involving Somaliland.
Gulf states maintain significant economic and security interests around regional ports.
Türkiye has played a mediation role between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The Red Sea question therefore places Ethiopia inside a dense network of competing interests.
Internal instability weakens Addis Ababa’s ability to navigate those relationships from a position of strength.
The Horn Is Being Pulled into Wider Geopolitical Competition
The Ethiopian crisis cannot be separated completely from the wider transformation of the Horn of Africa.
Sudan remains at war.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are increasingly distrustful of one another.
Somalia continues to face political fragmentation and jihadist violence.
The Red Sea is under growing military pressure from the conflict in Yemen.
Meanwhile, Gulf states and other external powers are competing for influence through investment, military relationships and port infrastructure.
Reuters reported earlier in 2026 that competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was increasingly shaping political alignments across the Horn.
For Ethiopia, this creates opportunities as well as risks.
Multiple external actors want relationships with Addis Ababa.
That gives the Ethiopian government diplomatic options.
But it also means domestic conflicts can quickly acquire regional dimensions when foreign states support different partners or interpret Ethiopian moves through their own security competition.
Ethiopia Remains Too Important for the Region to Ignore
Despite its internal problems, Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s most strategically important states.
It is the continent’s second-most populous country.
Addis Ababa hosts the African Union.
The country sits between the Red Sea security system, the Nile Basin, Sudan, Somalia and the wider East African economy.
Ethiopia is also the source of much of the Blue Nile’s flow and operates the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, placing it at the centre of long-running water-security disputes involving Egypt and Sudan.
Its internal trajectory therefore affects far more than Ethiopian politics.
A stable Ethiopia can function as a regional diplomatic and economic centre.
A fragmented Ethiopia would transmit instability toward several neighbouring states simultaneously.
That makes the renewed Tigray conflict strategically important even before its final military trajectory is clear.
Strategic Assessment: Ethiopia’s External Ambitions Depend on Internal Stability
Ethiopia’s diplomatic strategy is based on flexibility.
Addis Ababa wants maritime access without dependence on a single port.
It wants investment without exclusive alignment with one geopolitical bloc.
It wants technology partnerships with countries such as Israel while maintaining broader relationships across Africa, the Gulf and Asia.
That strategy is rational for a country with Ethiopia’s size and geographic position.
But its success depends on the federal government’s ability to maintain domestic cohesion.
The renewed fighting in Tigray creates five indicators worth monitoring.
The military trajectory in Tigray and Afar.
If fighting expands beyond the current theatres, Ethiopia could return to a multi-front internal war.
The future of the Pretoria Agreement.
A return to negotiations would indicate that some institutional framework for de-escalation survives. Its complete abandonment would sharply increase the risk of prolonged conflict.
Eritrean involvement.
Evidence of direct Eritrean support for Ethiopian armed groups — or direct military intervention — would dramatically increase the regional implications.
Red Sea diplomacy.
Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access will remain one of the principal variables shaping relations with Eritrea, Somalia and other regional actors.
Foreign economic partnerships.
Continued Israeli, Gulf, Chinese and other investment despite the security deterioration would indicate confidence that the crisis can be contained. Delays or withdrawals would suggest that internal conflict is beginning to undermine Ethiopia’s development strategy.
Ethiopia is therefore navigating two strategic processes at the same time.
It is attempting to expand its regional influence and diversify its international partnerships while once again confronting fundamental questions about domestic political order.
The central risk is not simply that renewed fighting in Tigray will destabilize northern Ethiopia. It is that internal fragmentation could begin to limit Addis Ababa’s ability to shape the wider Horn of Africa at precisely the moment when competition over the Red Sea, trade routes and regional alliances is intensifying.