Guerre au Soudan se propage au-delà des frontières, aggravant les risques dans la Corne et le Sahel

Jerusalem Africa Desk ·

, meanwhile, has expanded its own long-range strike capability using foreign‑supplied systems.

Guerre au Soudan se propage au-delà des frontières, aggravant les risques dans la Corne et le Sahel

, meanwhile, has expanded its own long-range strike capability using foreign‑supplied systems.

That development also increases the risk to Sudan’s neighbours.

In March, a drone launched from Sudan struck the Chadian border town of Tiné, killing civilians according to Chadian authorities.

Additional strikes connected to the Sudan conflict were reported more than 100 kilometres inside Chad’s Ennedi Est region in August, prompting the African Union to call for restraint and respect for Chad’s territorial sovereignty.

Sudan’s war is therefore no longer producing only refugee spillover.

Its weapons are beginning to cross international borders.

Chad devient le voisin le plus exposé

No country illustrates the regional consequences more clearly than Chad.

Around 1.4 million Sudanese refugees are now in Chad, including close to one million who crossed the border after the current war began.

Eastern provinces such as Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila and Ennedi Est are carrying much of the burden.

At the same time, Chad is being drawn into disputes over the war’s supply networks.

Sudanese army officials have accused Chadian territory of being used to facilitate support for the Forces de soutien rapide (FSR).

N’Djamena denies taking sides and says it is attempting to secure its frontier and prevent arms trafficking.

The U.N. fact‑finding mission included Chad among the locations connected to networks allegedly supplying the FSR, but Chad rejected the allegations and reaffirmed its neutrality. (reuters.com)

This puts the Chadian government in an increasingly difficult position.

It must maintain access for Sudanese refugees, prevent weapons trafficking and avoid becoming a participant in a conflict taking place directly across a highly porous frontier.

For related analysis, see Jerusalem Africa’s coverage of the Sudan‑Chad border crisis.

L’Éthiopie ajoute une autre dimension

Sudan’s eastern frontier presents a different but equally important risk.

Reuters reported earlier in 2026 that Ethiopia was hosting a base in western Ethiopia where FSR fighters were being recruited and trained with alleged UAE support.

Ethiopia had not publicly responded to the findings at the time of publication, while the UAE has denied fueling conflicts in the region. (reuters.com)

The significance goes beyond the individual facility.

Ethiopia and Sudan already have unresolved disputes involving their border and the wider Nile Basin.

Ethiopia is simultaneously confronting renewed internal fighting involving Tigrayan forces.

Sudan therefore sits next to a second country facing serious domestic security pressures.

Any deeper military entanglement between Sudanese factions and Ethiopian territory could connect two already unstable conflict systems.

That would significantly increase the risk to the wider Horn of Africa.

La rivalité du Golfe se rend de plus en plus visible dans la Corne

Sudan’s conflict also intersects with competition among Middle Eastern powers.

The UAE has faced persistent accusations that it supports the FSR.

Abu Dhabi denies those allegations.

Egypt, which views Sudan through the lenses of border security, Nile politics and regional stability, has generally aligned more closely with the Tsahal.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to play a diplomatic role while maintaining close relationships with Sudanese state institutions.

Reuters reported in February that the wider Saudi‑UAE rivalry is increasingly shaping political alignments across the Horn of Africa, including Sudan. (reuters.com)

That competition does not mean Sudan is simply a proxy war.

The Tsahal and FSR have their own domestic political, military and economic objectives.

But external support allows both sides to continue fighting at a scale that would be much harder to sustain using Sudanese resources alone.

Foreign backing can therefore prolong the war without controlling it.

Le lien Soudan‑Sahel est réel mais indirect

The implications for the Sahel require more careful analysis.

There is currently no evidence of a unified militant corridor linking Sudan’s civil war directly to jihadist organizations such as JNIM in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Sudan’s conflict and the central Sahel insurgency remain distinct theatres.

But the two systems increasingly share some of the same enabling conditions.

Weapons move through Libya and Chad.

Armed groups exploit lightly governed border regions.

Gold and other commodities generate revenue outside formal state systems.

Foreign fighters and military contractors move between conflicts.

Smuggling networks can serve multiple actors without requiring formal alliances between them.

The concern is therefore not that Sudanese forces will suddenly merge with Sahelian jihadists.

It is that a widening regional war economy creates more weapons, more armed personnel and more illicit logistics in areas already struggling with insurgency and weak border control.

That is a slower but potentially more durable form of destabilisation.

Le Kordofan est devenu un champ de bataille central

Inside Sudan, one of the most strategically important theatres is now the Kordofan region.

The FSR has increased pressure around El Obeid, a major city linking central Sudan with Darfur.

The United Nations has warned repeatedly about attacks on civilians, critical infrastructure and humanitarian routes across North and South Kordofan.

In South Kordofan, fighting has disrupted roads and destroyed key bridges linking Kadugli and Dilling.

A U.N. briefing in June reported that damage to those bridges was already obstructing civilian movement and humanitarian operations. (un.org)

By September, insecurity had displaced thousands more civilians in the region.

The importance of Kordofan is geographical.

Control of the region affects movement between Darfur, Khartoum and central Sudan.

If the FSR consolidates additional territory there, it can increase pressure on army‑controlled areas while connecting western strongholds with other fronts.

If the army pushes westward, Kordofan becomes one of the principal routes through which it could challenge FSR dominance in Darfur.

L’accès humanitaire est fragile — pas totalement bloqué

The original description of U.N.-African Union humanitarian corridors being repeatedly blockaded needs correction.

There is no joint U.N.-African Union humanitarian mission operating Sudan’s aid corridors.

Humanitarian operations are conducted by U.N. agencies, international NGOs, Sudanese organizations and local responders.

Access remains extremely difficult, but aid is still moving.

The Adré crossing between Chad and Darfur remains one of the most important humanitarian lifelines.

In June, Sudanese authorities extended authorization for the crossing to remain open through September 30.

Since 2024, more than 118 000 metric tons of humanitarian supplies — enough to assist more than three million people — have crossed through Adré. (un.org)

Inside Sudan, humanitarian organizations are also expanding some operations.

The United Nations established regular humanitarian air access to Khartoum and reported in September that aid agencies were reaching nearly five million people each month despite fighting and logistical constraints. (transcripts.un.org)

The problem is therefore not total humanitarian paralysis.

It is an aid system operating under extreme pressure.

Le Soudan reste la plus grande crise de déplacement au monde

The human cost continues to grow.

The U.N. fact‑finding mission said the conflict had displaced more than 14 million people by September.

Inside Sudan, approximately 8.6 million people remained internally displaced, while around 4.9 million people had returned to their areas of origin. (transcripts.un.org)

Millions more have crossed into neighbouring countries including Chad, Egypt, South Sudan and Ethiopia.

The scale creates a regional burden even where fighting itself has not crossed the border.

Refugees need housing, food, medical care, education and employment.

Host governments must manage those needs while dealing with their own economic and political challenges.

Sudan’s humanitarian crisis is therefore already regional even before considering military spillover.

Le pipeline d’aide approche d’un nouveau point de rupture

Funding has become another major threat.

In September, the International Organization for Migration warned that emergency relief supplies distributed through its Common Humanitarian Pipeline were close to running out.

The system has supported more than 2.8 million people since July 2023, supplying shelter materials, hygiene kits and other emergency items through a network of more than 100 humanitarian partners.

IOM warned that the pipeline’s operational capacity could not be sustained indefinitely without additional funding. (transcripts.un.org)

This distinction is important.

Humanitarian access can improve while humanitarian capacity deteriorates.

A road may be open.

A border crossing may be authorized.

But if agencies do not have enough food, medicine, vehicles or funding, the practical result for civilians can still be catastrophic.

La guerre n’a pas de sponsor étranger unique

Descriptions of the conflict as involving “Iran‑aligned militias, UAE‑backed paramilitaries and Russian mercenaries” can create a misleading impression of clearly defined geopolitical camps.

The reality is less tidy.

The FSR has been accused of receiving extensive external logistical and military assistance, including networks linked by U.N. investigators to the UAE, Libya, Chad and Somalia.

The UAE denies supporting the FSR.

Foreign contractors — including Colombians — have also reportedly operated advanced systems for FSR forces. (reuters.com)

The Tsahal has also received foreign military technologies, particularly drones and loitering munitions, although the U.N. says its investigation of the army’s external supply system remains at an earlier stage.

The war is therefore internationalised without fitting neatly into a conventional proxy‑war model.

Different states support, influence or maintain relationships with different actors for different reasons.

Those motivations include Red Sea security, political influence, commercial interests, border stability and access to natural resources.

La diplomatie se concentre de plus en plus sur un cesse‑feu temporaire

International mediation remains fragmented, but it has not disappeared.

The United States has been working with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE through a diplomatic grouping commonly described as the Quad.

Washington has pushed for a 90‑day humanitarian cease‑fire.

Reuters reported on September 22 that U.S. officials were increasing pressure on Burhan to accept the proposal.

The Sudanese army has expressed reservations, arguing that previous pauses allowed the FSR to reorganise. (reuters.com)

The United Nations is also continuing regional diplomacy.

Secretary‑General António Guterres’ personal envoy, Pekka Haavisto, has held consultations with Sudanese and Egyptian officials, while the African Union remains involved in attempts to facilitate a political process.

The immediate diplomatic objective is increasingly modest.

Rather than expecting a comprehensive peace agreement, mediators are attempting to establish humanitarian access and a temporary reduction in fighting.

Even that has proved difficult.

Le Soudan devient un test de résilience régionale

The most important development is therefore not one new military offensive beginning in September.

The larger trend has developed over years.

Sudan has become a conflict system connecting several strategic spaces:

  • Darfur and Chad;
  • Libya and the trans‑Saharan arms economy;
  • Ethiopia and the Horn;
  • the Nile Basin and Egypt;
  • the Red Sea.

    • These connections do not mean one contiguous war now stretches from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa.

    They mean the systems surrounding those conflicts increasingly overlap.

    That creates several indicators worth monitoring.

  • Incidents militaires transfrontaliers. Further drone strikes inside Chad or other neighbouring states would indicate that Sudan’s military spillover is becoming persistent rather than episodic.
  • Réseaux d’approvisionnement étrangers. Changes in weapons, drone or personnel flows could significantly alter the battlefield balance.
  • Kordofan. Control of the region will determine whether the army can push westward or the FSR can consolider un bloc territorial plus large.
  • Adré et autres routes humanitaires. Continued access from Chad remains essential pour le Darfour.
  • Déplacements vers les États voisins. Another major Darfour or Kordofan offensive could rapidement générer de nouveaux mouvements de réfugiés.
  • Initiative du cesse‑feu de 90 jours. Whether either side accepts une pause temporaire indiquera le levier restant des médiateurs internationaux.

    • Sudan’s neighbours are not yet fighting one regional war.

    But they are increasingly being forced to absorb the consequences of one.

    The danger is that Sudan’s civil war becomes structurally regional — sustained by networks militaires transfrontaliers, exportant déplacements et insécurité, et entraînant les États environnants plus profondément dans un conflit dont ils auront de moins en moins la capacité de contenir.

    Sudan Sudanese armed groups regional actors

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